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Summary
Key findings in behavioral economics are that people’s behavior (revealed preferences) is often not
in line with their intentions (normative preferences), that they are sensitive to the way choices
are presented to them, and that their cognitive abilities are limited. This is manifest in partic-
ular in areas of intertemporal choice, like personal finance and health-related behavior. Policy
makers can develop policies that help citizens to make choices that are more in line with their
normative preferences. In this paper we summarize the behavioral evidence, discuss the motiva-
tions for interventions, and show how recent behavioral insights can help to improve upon exist-
ing policies. These new policies could be described as libertarian paternalism, and include setting
defaults thoughtfully and using unorthodox commitment mechanisms.
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1 INTRODUCTION
God must love those common folk that behavioral science economists
write about, because She made so many of them (Paul A. Samuelson
2006).
Policymakers intervene in market economies for a variety of reasons, using
different types of policy instruments. These policies are motivated either by
externalities and/or are based on paternalistic considerations: people may need
help to avoid choices that they will regret at a later stage. Paternalistic regu-
lation traditionally aims to protect people that are thought to be less capable
to make decisions that are in their best interest: Children, because they like
to play rather than do their homework; adolescents who may easily succumb
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alcohol; desperate adults in financial distress who may agree to an abusive
contract – hence usury laws and health and safety regulations of dangerous
occupations.1
Recent research in behavioral economics, however, shows that sizeable deci-
sion-making errors are not limited to vulnerable groups, but omnipresent and
systematic. To mention one example, Choi et al. (2005) show that employ-
ees forgo thousands of dollars annually by not fully exploiting their employer
match in a retirement savings plan. The revenues forgone are too large to
be plausibly explained by transaction costs. Educational interventions often
have little effect, and do not pass basic costs-benefit tests. Moreover, seem-
ingly unimportant aspects of a choice setting – framing and defaults – often
have large effects on behavior.
Findings like these have far-reaching implications for policy makers. First,
they may expand the scope of paternalistic regulation beyond groups tra-
ditionally considered to be vulnerable. Second, they question the effective-
ness of policies that rely on information and education. Third, since framing
and defaults cannot be avoided, it is better to use them wisely. At the same
time, behavioral economics findings provide policy makers with a new tool kit
for policy design: If individual choice is affected by the choice architecture,
governments can deliberately choose the architecture to achieve policy goals.
Policies that do not recognize these (psychological) mechanisms may have
counterproductive effects.
In this paper we first summarize the key insights from behavioral economics,
in Section 2. Next, we discuss the motivations for interventions, focusing on the
distinction between normative and revealed preferences in Section 3. In the light
of the behavioral insights, we then rethink policy design in the Netherlands in
the fields of personal finance (Section 4) and health-related behavior (Section 5).
These are areas in which there is a large amount of evidence on systematic devia-
tions from rationality. In both domains choices often have a large, long-term, and
irreversible impact, both at an individual level and for society as a whole.
We conclude that current reason-based policies aimed at influencing indi-
vidual choice are often inadequate in helping people make better choices. At
the same time, many of these policies can be easily adapted to make them
(much) more effective, often at very low costs.
2 KEY FINDINGS IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
Rational individual choice requires that decision makers have complete infor-
mation, unlimited cognitive abilities, consistent preferences, and will-power.
1 Until 1956 married women in the Netherlands were thought of as another category inca-
pable of contracting for themselves. In that year the law changed with the so-called “Lex-van-
Oven” law, named after the social democrat minister who took the initiative for the change.
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Both real-world and experimental evidence indicates that these conditions are
rarely satisfied. This section summarizes the evidence. We do not intend pro-
vide a comprehensive review; several excellent recent surveys have been pub-
lished; see for example DellaVigna (2009) and Camerer (2006).
2.1 Incomplete Information, Limited Cognitive Abilities, and Choice Paralysis
Stigler (1961) noted already half a century ago that information is a traded
good, and that consumers are not necessarily perfectly informed in equilib-
rium. The raison d’ eˆtre of many firms in the service sector is that they
offer information and decision tools that may help clients with their choices:
advertisements, brochures, internet tools, consultancies, product packaging,
and specialized media.
Likewise, the concept of bounded rationality has been around for more
than half a century; see Simon (1957). However, more precise evidence on
the nature of bounded rationality is of relatively recent date. In particular,
bounded rationality in the financial domain has been studied extensively. Stud-
ies for the US by Bernheim (1998) and Hogarth et al. (2003) reveal that most
respondents do not understand basic financial concepts like simple interest
calculations, let alone more complex ones related to bonds, stocks and mutual
funds. Note that these findings apply to a country that is traditionally com-
mitted to self-reliance and individual responsibility. These authors also find
that people often fail to understand loans and, particularly, mortgages? a
finding that is confirmed by Miles (2005) for UK borrowers. Lusardi and
Mitchell (2005) surveyed Americans of the age 50+ and conclude that only
half of these respondents could correctly answer two simple questions regard-
ing interest and inflation. van Rooij et al. (2007) find that 50 percent of Dutch
employees consider themselves to be financially very incompetent, while a
minority of only 20 percent regarded themselves as knowledgeable. In a sur-
vey only 40 percent of respondents provided correct answers to five very sim-
ple questions on basic knowledge regarding inflation and interest. Scores on
investment questions were also poor, with four out of five respondents miss-
ing at least two questions.
Economists have traditionally assumed that more choice is better. This
view is now challenged, as several studies indicate that when there is “too
much” choice, people are discouraged from choosing anything. Iyengar and
Lepper (2000) found that if consumers can choose between 26 types of jam,
60 percent will take part in tasting, compared with 40 percent if only six types
are offered. But, while in the 6-options group 30 percent actually decide to
buy, only 3 percent in the 26-options group decide to buy. If this “choice
paralysis” already applies to products that do not require much expert knowl-
edge like jam, it is not difficult to imagine the role it plays in the choice
between complicated products, such as financial ones; see also Schwartz (2005).
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2.2 Default Effects
Evidence shows that people often “choose not to choose”. As a result, defaults
or standards (what you choose if you do not take action, silent consent) may
strongly affect behavior. The default effect exists for a wide range of domains.
Evidence includes car insurance plan choices (Johnson et al. 1993), organ
donation decisions (Johnson and Goldstein 2003; Abadie and Gay 2006),
and pizza consumption (Levin et al. 2002), and it is especially prominent in
retirement saving. Defaults play a role in pension plan participation, in the
retirement savings rate, in pension portfolio choice and in the withdrawal of
pension wealth. In a study by Beshears et al. (2006), over 90 percent of
employees immediately participates in a pension plan in the case of auto-
matic enrollment. If instead the default is non-enrollment, employees hesitate
to enroll. This is illustrated by Figure 1, taken from Beshears et al. (2006).
Company A changed its enrollment policy for new employees, from auto-
matic non-enrollment (opt-in) to automatic enrollment (opt-out). As Figure 1
shows, with automatic non-enrollment participation starts below 60 percent
of employees and increases to about 80 percent in two years. With automatic
enrollment, participation is almost 100 percent within three months.
Figure 1 also illustrates the powerful effect of the default savings rate.
Company A doubled its default savings rate for new hires, from 3 to 6 per-
cent. As Figure 1 shows, participation was the same under the 3 and the 6
percent default rate.
The effect of default savings rates on retirement savings is not unambig-
uous, however. Whereas more employees do participate in case of automatic
enrollment, there may be employees who would have chosen a higher savings
rate than the default if no automatic enrollment and rate had been offered.
This is shown in the authors’ Figure 2, which compares the distribution of the
Figure 1 – Automatic enrollment for new hires and savings plan participation: company A.
Source: Beshears et al. (2006)
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Figure 2 – Automatic enrollment for existing hires and the distribution of 401(k) contribution
rates: Company A(25–48months tenure). Source: Beshears et al. (2006)
retirement savings rate in Company A before and after default enrollment was
introduced. The picture shows that the savings rate before automatic enroll-
ment was 6 percent or higher for about 90 percent of the plan participants.
After automatic enrollment was introduced, 60 percent of participants chose
the default rate of 3 percent, and only 25 percent of new participants saved
6 percent or more. Thus, where automatic enrollment speeds up participa-
tion and increases the participation rate, it does not necessarily increase total
retirement savings.
Default effects in retirement saving are not limited to participation and to
the contribution rate. The asset allocation of the retirement savings portfo-
lio is also default-sensitive (Beshears et al. 2006; Cronquist and Thaler 2004;
Choi et al. 2005). Between one-third and 50 percent of employees hold some
of their balances in the default portfolio offered by the employer, and between
25 and 40 percent hold all their balances in this fund.
With regard to health, the dominant culture in most societies is to avoid
doctors unless some immediate health problem emerges. The attitudes of
healthcare providers and citizens can be characterized as disease management
rather than health management. Strong evidence suggests, however, that pre-
ventive healthcare is underutilized; See, for example, Weinstein (2005). This
implies that welfare may be increased by changing the default of not-going to
a doctor to going to a doctor on a regular basis for screening and other pre-
ventive interventions. Another area in health in which defaults play an impor-
tant role is organ donation. See Section 5 for an elaboration.
2.3 Framing Effects
Another type of bias in decision making is people’s sensitivity to the framing,
or formulation, of the decision problem. There are several types of framing
effects relevant in the context of life cycle saving and investing and/or health:
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– A long-standing literature has discussed money illusion, i.e. the phenom-
enon that people’s preferences and behavior depend on irrelevant cur-
rency units. The currency unit in which a decision problem is expressed
is obviously part of its framing. Using a variety of empirical approaches,
researchers have found strong indications of money illusion. Examples are
Shafir et al. (1997) using stated preference data, Fehr and Tyran (2001)
using laboratory experiments, and Kooreman et al. (2004) using a quasi-
experimental approach. Kooreman et al. (2004) found that after the intro-
duction of the euro people donated more in real terms to a charity than
they did before.
– If a choice is framed in terms of gains, people avoid risk. If it instead is
framed in terms of losses, they choose risk? hoping to avoid losses. This
effect displays an asymmetric risk appetite: people are risk-averse in the
domain of winning, but risk-seeking in the domain of losing (Kahneman
and Tversky 1984; see also Bernstein 1996). The risk-seeking behavior in
the domain of losses runs counter to the standard assumption in pre-
behavioral microeconomic theory.
– People prefer choice in the (literal) middle. Benartzi and Thaler (2001)
asked respondents to rate the attractiveness of portfolios that varied in
terms of risk and return due to different percentages allocated to equities.
They found that participants in defined-contribution schemes tended to
avoid extremes, either by choosing the middle portfolio when offered three,
or by allocating their savings equally over all of the portfolios they were
offered. Moreover, respondents were inconsistent in the sense that when
asked to rate portfolios, many preferred the median portfolio to their own.
van Rooij et al. (2007) found similar results for employees in the Nether-
lands.
– Framing effects also occur in the domain of probability and risk percep-
tions. Evidence includes insurance and health prevention. Johnson et al.
(1993) reported the results of an experiment with three groups of indi-
viduals who had to decide how much they would pay for a flight insur-
ance policy that would provide life insurance of 100,000 dollar in case
they should die during a flight to London. Each group was offered dif-
ferent conditions for the coverage: death on the airplane due to any act
of terrorism, due to any mechanical failure, or due to any reason. What-
ever the risk attitudes of the participants, it would be rational if the mean
Premium offered would be highest for the insurance policy that covers in
case of death due to any reason. Instead, the premiums that the groups
were willing to pay did not differ. Persuasive effects of framing can also
be found in health campaigns. Campaigns stressing reductions in mortal-
ity (e.g. from 6 to 4 percent) are more effective than campaigns stress-
ing increases in survival (e.g. from 94 to 96 percent). Presenting absolute
risks is more effective than informing about relative risks, and presenting
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the positive effects of a breast-screening decision over the woman’s life-
time is more effective than presenting the health effects in the next few
years.
A specific example of framing is labeling (or “mental accounting”). Koore-
man (2000) found that the marginal propensity to consume child clothing
out of child benefit is ten times as large as the marginal propensity to con-
sume child clothing out of other income. His result indicates that expendi-
tures patterns can be influenced by merely changing the label of income com-
ponents.
As a final example of the persuasive power of framing effects, consider
the dilemma of combating disease (Bernstein 1996). Assume that a Minister of
Healthcare needs to take a decision on how to fight a rare and highly conta-
gious disease, which if no precautions are taken is expected to kill 600 people.
He is presented with the following choice:
There are two ways of combating this disease. If we choose approach
A, 200 lives out of the 600 will be saved. Method B offers a one-third
chance that all 600 will be saved and a two-third chance that no-one will
survive. Which method would you prefer?
In terms of human lives both methods offer the same expected outcomes: A
has 200 lives saved at a probability of one. The only difference between A
and B is that A offers certainty while B presents risk: one doesn’t know how
many people will be saved. Experimental evidence indicates that over seventy
per cent of the people go for certainty and pick A.
However, the decision problem facing the Minister could also be formu-
lated as follows.
There are two ways of combating this disease. If we choose approach A,
400 out of 600 people will die. Method B offers a one-third chance that
no-one dies and a two-third chance that all will die. Which method would
you prefer?
When framed this way, more than 70 percent choose method B. The only dif-
ference between the decision problems is their wording. The first is presented
in terms of gains (lives saved), the second in terms of loss (people dying).
2.4 Lack of Willpower
One special case of preference inconsistency involves the time dimension of
preferences. Since Samuelson (1937), the conventional assumption in
microeconomic theory has been that when choosing between current and future
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consumption the individual applies exponential discounting. However, as Sam-
uelson himself stated, this assumption of time-consistent preferences is ‘com-
pletely arbitrary’. Yet, exponential discounting, which implies that the ratio
between consumption preferences in two periods is independent of time, has
been the key assumption in microeconomic models. Empirical evidence, how-
ever, shows that humans typically make short-term choices that can harm
their welfare across their planning horizon. Laibson (1997) points at the exis-
tence of self-enforcement mechanisms like Christmas Clubs as an indication
of will-power problems.2 The problem of self-control is formally described by
assuming that people discount future utility hyperbolically, which implies that
discounting is not constant, but a decreasing function of time. As a result, in
the present it looks easy to start saving (dieting, quit smoking) at some point
in the future. But by the time the future has become the present, it will be
as difficult as it is today. This implies an incentive for consumers to constrain
their own future choices, provided they are sophisticated, that is that they are
aware of their preference inconsistency. 3
Evidence of lack of willpower is also found in the health domain. DellaVi-
gna and Malmendier (2006) found that members of a health club who chose a
flat monthly fee contract of $70 paid 70 percent more than if they would have
chosen to pay per visit. They also found that people delay canceling their
subscription, possibly due to overconfidence about future attendance. Other
indications of a lack of willpower are the large amounts of money spent on
dietary and smoking-cessation programs. In the Netherlands, only 14 percent
of smokers are satisfied with their habit, and do not consider stopping. One
quarter of smokers would like to stop within a year, while 14 percents would
like to stop, but not within a year (another indication of procrastination).
Forty percent of the Dutch population is currently overweight (BMI between
25 and 30), 10 percent is obese (BMI over 30), while more than 50 percent of
the Dutch population wants to lose weight.4 Again, these are strong indica-
tions of the wide prevalence of self-control problems.
If time-inconsistent preferences, including willpower problems, procrastina-
tion and a strong present-bias, are the main reason why people make choices
that do not maximize their (self-defined) long term welfare, it is unlikely that
providing information will change behavior. In fact, evidence in the retire-
ment savings domain indicates that while information may affect intention, it
2 A member of a Christmas Club saves throughout the year – often at a zero interest rate –
without the possibility to withdraw money from the savings account until Christmas. The pur-
pose is to make sure that sufficient money is available in December to buy Christmas presents.
3 Poterba et al. (2003) argue that the tendency of elderly people to oversave could result
from rational behavior with a bequest motive; see also Caplin and Schotter (2008) and Merton
(2006). Another explanation is that markets lack financial instruments for life cycle planning
for the elderly, such as reverse mortgages.
4 Source: LISS-panel (www.lissdata.nl).
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hardly affects behavior. Choi et al, 2002 study the reponse to financial edu-
cation. They find that 100 percent plans to enroll in their employer’s pension
plan, but a mere 14% lives up to that resolution.
3 MOTIVATIONS FOR INTERVENTIONS
Key motivations for policy interventions with the explicit aim to affect indi-
viduals’ behavior are paternalism and externalities.5 An important difference
between the paternalistic policies in the current setting – ‘libertarian paternal-
ism’ – and traditional paternalistic policies is that libertarian paternalism aims
at helping individuals to act according to their own normative preferences. An
axiom underlying the motivation for this type of intervention is that revealed
preferences (“how much I actually save”) and normative preferences (“how
much I think I should save”) are distinct concepts.
As early as 1956 Strotz identified potential self-control issues in intertem-
poral choice behavior and suggested precommitment as a possible solution
(Strotz 1956). In a model that allows for a distinction between revealed and
normative preferences, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) describe an internal princi-
pal-agent problem between a planner and a doer. The planner has a long time
horizon and acts according to conventional economic theory, whereas the
doer lives for the moment. Ashraf et al. (2005) show that Smith in his Theory
of Moral Sentiments argues that much of human behavior is under the influ-
ence of the “passions” which are moderated by an internal “voice of reason”,
an “impartial spectator”. Smith’s impartial spectator is similar to the planner
in Thaler and Shefrin’s model of self-control. Herrnstein et al. (1993) assume
the existence of multiple selves and use the term “negative internalities” to
describe the effect of the behavior of the present doer on the future selves of
the individual. Neuroeconomics provides support for the planner-doer model.
FMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) scans show that different –
and conflicting – parts of the brain kick into action depending on the time
frame. Short-term gratification is the domain of the limbic system, the impul-
sive part of the brain, whereas the neocortex – the part of the brain in charge
of planning – wins on matters involving a long-term horizon (see, for exam-
ple, Ainslie and Monterosso 2004).
A fundamental problem is whether and how an individual’s own norma-
tive preferences can be identified. Dalton and Ghosal (2010) conclude that in
theory normative preferences can be identified from an individual’s choices
5 Although the motivations – paternalism, externalities – for policy interventions directed at
protecting individuals and at affecting individual behavior are analytically different, many reg-
ulations serve both purposes. The obligation to wear a helmet helps not only avoiding social
cost related to motor drivers accidents, but also avoiding regret by those who underestimate
the negative effects and/or the chances of having an accident and the induced emotional suf-
fering by others (Camerer et al. 2003).
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in selected restricted choice settings; see also Bernheim and Rangel (2009).
Beshears et al. (2010) argue that actual choices reveal both normative prefer-
ences and decision-making biases. For example, when an employee takes five
years to enroll in a pension plan this is suggestive of a legitimate (norma-
tive) preference for saving and a tendency to procrastinate. The ‘asymptotic’
choices are then more informative of normative preferences than short-run
behavior. Other ways to measure normative preferences include forcing people
to make any decision (“active choice”), simply asking people what they them-
selves think they should do, and relying on the opinion of impartial experts
and trained consumers. While each of these methods to identify normative
preferences has flaws, their combination is likely to provide the best possible
answer to how normative preferences look like.
Taking normative preferences as a reference point for the evaluation of
social welfare, policies can be designed that encourage individuals to
act according to their own normative preferences.
4 RETHINKING SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT POLICIES IN THE NETHERLANDS
We discuss a number of recent policies in The Netherlands from a behavioral
economics perspective.
4.1 The 2007 Pension Act
In the Netherlands a new Pension Act was adopted on January 1, 2007. The
aim of the new law is to give more transparency and guarantees to employees,
to give employees and retirees a legal right to information about their pen-
sion, and to provide a guarantee that the solvency of pension funds is ade-
quate to pay out future pensions. Moreover, in light of the Act on Financial
Services (WFD), pension plans have a “care-duty” (zorgplicht): they are to
protect their clients’ interests. The same applies to banks and insurance com-
panies and financial advisors.
The new Pension Act distinguishes pension schemes according to the types
of guarantees offered to employees. Plan participants should receive an annual
leaflet with their pension claims. This leaflet has to be uniform among all
pension plans. A national register is being set up with the aim of informing
employees about all his pension rights accrued while participating in various
plans during various jobs. In case of an individual defined contribution plan,
the fund is responsible for creating a default portfolio. Should the employee
opt out, then he has the right to invest his pension contributions within the
limits set by the employer and the pension plan. The pension plan has to
advise him in accordance with the know-your-customer (kyc) principle, with
portfolio risk falling as the retirement date draws closer. The kyc principle,
as laid down in the law on the financial Services Act, implies that the par-
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ticipant’s financial position, knowledge, expertise, goals and risk tolerance
should all be taken into account. The pension plan has the duty to provide
a yearly overview of results, comparing them to the results that would have
been obtained if the employee had followed the advice.
Information and transparency for end users is an important component of
the new pension act. While this represents an improvement over the previ-
ous state of affairs (no direct individual information for pension plan par-
ticipants), the information is partial (only nominal wealth, no information
on population probabilities like dying before retirement age). The mandatory
default option in individual DC plans as well as the limits to investment pos-
sibilities for the DC participant in the new Pension Act are indications of a
growing awareness among policymakers of the potential of standard options.
Many international experts regard the Dutch retirement system as one of
the best, if not the best, worldwide. Yet, the reduced values of the portfolios
backing pension fund liabilities triggered a policy debate about whether the
risk of price movements in financial markets should be run by the company
and its pension fund, or by individual employees. Several corporate pension
funds intend to shift this risk toward the employees by a changeover from a
defined benefit (DB) to a defined contribution (DC) pension scheme.
A defined contribution system has the potential of creating individually
tailored pension plans and facilitating individual decision-making. As estab-
lished in the previous sections, however, individual autonomy may not
promote and indeed reduce individual welfare for many employees, due to
behavioral biases and insufficient cognitive abilities; see Benartzi and Tha-
ler (2002). Many individual DC pension funds in the US have expressed
doubts about the quality of the investment choices made by their participants
(Benartzi and Thaler 2001; Mitchell and Zeldes 1996). Thaler and Benartzi
(2004) find that if left to choose, people save less than their optimal life cycle
savings rate would predict. For the Netherlands, similar evidence on actual
behavior is not available simply because the current system leaves very little
choice to individuals. However, we have seen Dutch employees conform to the
general pattern of financial illiteracy.
van Rooij et al. (2007) show that the vast majority of respondents is in
favor of compulsory saving for retirement and of a defined benefit pension
system. If offered a combined defined benefit/defined contribution system, the
majority of the respondents would like to have a guaranteed pension income
of 70 percent or more of their net labour income. If given investor auton-
omy, they are willing to change the composition of their retirement savings
portfolio in response to their personal financial situation, general economic
conditions, and expectations of financial markets. Respondents who have cho-
sen a relatively safe portfolio (less stock, more bonds) appear to prefer the
retirement income streams of the median investment portfolio to their own
portfolio choice. The average respondent considers himself financially unso-
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phisticated, and is not eager to take control of retirement savings investment
when offered the possibility to increase expertise. These findings strengthen
the case for guidance.6
4.2 The Life-course Arrangement
One way to promote life cycle planning at the individual level is to create
facilities to smooth income and leisure over time; see Bovenberg (2005). The
life-course savings arrangement (levensloopregeling) introduced in 2006 in the
Netherlands did originally have precisely this aim. Workers can save for when
their personal circumstances make it attractive to have more leisure time. Tax
facilities to promote life-course saving include tax deferral (omkeerregeling),
subsidies for parents who use the life-course arrangement to stay at home
with young children, and tax exemptions for subsidies by employers. When
developing this facility, policymakers made no use of knowledge about behav-
ioral incentives such as defaults. Thus, workers need to actively opt-out of the
previous savings arrangement (spaarloon), and opt in in the life-course sys-
tem.
The arrangement is both more expensive and less effective than was envis-
aged. However, a much more effective use could be made of defaults, labeling,
and timing in the design and the implementation of the life-course scheme.
As an example of using defaults, participation in the levensloopregeling could
be set as the default choice rather than nonparticipation (which is the cur-
rent default option for a large majority of employees). As an example of using
labeling, “vacation allowance” could be relabeled into “savings allowance” or
“contribution to life-course account”.7 Results in Kooreman et al. (2010) and
Kooreman (2000) indicate that this change affects contributions to the life-
course scheme, especially for households that are liquidity constrained. As an
example of using timing of salary components, some salary components could
be at a lower-than-monthly frequency, which is likely to be associated with a
higher marginal propensity to save (see Kooreman et al. 2010).
4.3 Financial Education
As mentioned in Section 2, financial illiteracy is widespread, and financial
education campaigns are popular. In the UK, the Financial Services Author-
ity has launched a financial education campaign in 2006 (see www.fsa.gov).
6 A committee chaired by Frijns et al. (2010) recommends that pension funds offer and com-
municate real instead of nominal pension benefits, in order to prevent confusion (money illu-
sion) for pension plan participants.
7 Vacation allowance – roughly 8 percent of annual net income – is paid in May. As of
2007, some employers have changed to paying vacation allowance as a monthly supplement
to regular income.
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The US Treasury has launched its National Strategy for Financial Literacy in
Autumn 2006. In November 2006, the Dutch Ministry of Finance established
CentIQ, which aims to help financial consumers to become “well informed,
educated, and able to confidently make well-considered financial decisions”.
While carefully designed financial education could be effective in influenc-
ing intentions, it is unlikely to change behavior, given the evidence summa-
rized in the previous sections. As we have seen, even with full information,
many individuals make poor choices. Moreover, employees in the Netherlands
are not motivated to increase their financial sophistication even if they are
offered education at no cost (van Rooij et al. 2007). Given that new technol-
ogies have created a wider array of financial products to choose from, and
deregulation policies have shifted more responsibilities and risk towards the
individual, this can be interpreted as another manifestation of choice paraly-
sis. Robert C. Merton argues that new technology and deregulation have
left households with the responsibility for making important and techni-
cally complex micro financial decisions involving risks . . . . . . that they
had not had to make in the past, are not trained to make in the present,
and are unlikely to execute efficiently in the future, even with attempts
at education (Merton 2003).
In a world in which choice and risk are shifted to individuals, the traditional
policy focus is on making markets work (hence the establishment of antitrust
authorities and market conduct watchdogs) and on ensuring that individu-
als are well-informed (hence the programs for educating financial consum-
ers, the new rules for transparency with regard to the quality of services and
products). However, as Merton suggests, institutions – public and/or private –
should develop products that simplify decision-making for individuals. Infor-
mation and financial illiteracy appear not to be the main issues, but rather the
abundance of choice, temptation for immediate reward, few opportunities to
learn from mistakes, and third party marketing that benefits from consumer
irrationality (Beshears et al. 2010).
4.4 The Possibly Detrimental Effects of More Competition in Financial
Markets
In the theory of product differentiation the basic task of firms is to bun-
dle product characteristics into products that consumers can appreciate and
choose from. It also allows for branding and brand loyalty and thus makes
microeconomic theory more in line with what we see in the real world. How-
ever, as Laibson and Gabaix (2006) show, competition may increase consumer
confusion and facilitate extracting rents from unsophisticated consumers. In
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Gabaix and Laibson’s model, sophisticated consumers are subsidized in equi-
librium by unsophisticated consumers.
To the extent that financial education has a role to play in planning for
retirement saving, it is therefore important that the education is provided by
impartial actors.
4.5 Commitment Mechanisms
Many citizens in the Netherlands (including civil servants) have limited or no
freedom to make financial provisions for retirement. Others (including freel-
ancers) are completely free in this respect. Policymakers should also offer
commitment mechanisms to help them save enough for retirement in view of
the evidence of undersaving.
Thaler and Benartzi (2004) report the results of the implementation of
SMarT, a prescriptive program for retirement savings. Their goal was to ascer-
tain whether implementing a commitment strategy for non-compulsory retire-
ment savings would encourage workers to save more. The program consists
of four elements. First, employees could commit to a savings plan where the
sign-up date would lay far ahead of the actual start-up date. The purpose of
the delay was to overcome the hyperbolic discounting problem. Second, work-
ers committed to saving more after each nominal pay rise. Third, contribu-
tions would rise slowly until a maximum savings rate was reached. Finally,
workers could opt out any time, but not lower their savings rate. Thaler and
Benartzi find that the plan was extremely popular with participants, whose
savings rate on average increased gradually from 3.5 to 13.6 percent. Similar
commitment mechanisms can be straightforwardly applied in the Netherlands.
5 RETHINKING HEALTH POLICIES IN THE NETHERLANDS
5.1 Limited Consumer Sovereignty
If there is any domain of choice in which consumer sovereignty is severely
limited, it is in healthcare. One obvious example is the case of emergencies,
when consumer is often physically and/or mentally unable to make a deci-
sion of any kind. The same is true for mentally disabled persons and for
young children. In life-threatening and other unsettling situations, decisions
on healthcare are dictated by external factors, such as the location of a traffic
accident and the decisions of third-party representatives. Although individu-
als could in principle choose in advance what they prefer if several contingen-
cies materialize, optimal choices are difficult or impossible to make even for
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individuals who otherwise act in a fully rational manner. In these cases strong
paternalism is both desirable and unavoidable.8
Secondly, even in a non-emergency situation, making appropriate decisions
in health requires knowledge that takes health specialists many years of train-
ing to acquire. This asymmetry in information between principles (consum-
ers) and agents (doctors) renders the former vulnerable (see Dulleck and
Kerschbamer 2006). Moreover, a negative health shock of a given type
is often a once-in-a-lifetime event, and therefore offers little opportunity for
learning.
A number of studies (including Craik and Salthouse 2000), have shown
that – apart from dementia and other illnesses – cognitive abilities (strongly)
decrease in age after the age of 50. Agarwal et al. (2009) find evidence that
financial mistakes follow a U-shape over the life cycle, with cost-minimiza-
tion occurring around age 53. About half of the population between ages 80
and 89 either has dementia or a medical diagnosis of “cognitive impairment
without dementia”. The older population is thus even more vulnerable with
respect to healthcare and other choices than are other groups in society.
The insights of Glaeser (2006) discussed in previous sections also have pol-
icy implications for healthcare markets. Given the asymmetry in information
between consumers and providers that is inherent in healthcare, more compe-
tition and more alternatives are likely to increase consumer confusion.
5.2 Minimizing Informational Failures
Suboptimal choices partly result from informational failures and mispercep-
tions of risks. Either there is ignorance or suppression (underestimation), or
risks are exaggerated (hypochondria). For example, public perception of the
risk of lung cancer for a lifetime smoker is about 0.45, whereas actual risk
is estimated to be about 0.10; see Khwaja et al. (2006), and Kip (2007). This
type of misperception is partly due to the fact that government information
on the detrimental effects of unhealthy behaviors is almost exclusively qual-
itative in nature. Government regulations in the Netherlands, for example,
require that cigarette packs display the announcement “Roken is dodelijk”
(smoking is lethal) in large bold print. It would be more informative to men-
tion the approximate reduction in expected lifetime as a result of smoking one
pack of cigarettes. Note that information could also discourage self-protective
behavior if existing decision biases promote self-protection (smokers who stop
because they overestimate the health risks of smoking; see Downs et al. 2009).
8 For preventive and elective care, healthcare demand elasticities with respect to prices
(including travel time and costs) and quality are higher than for emergency care (see Ringel
et al. 2002), suggesting more consumer sovereignty in former areas of healthcare.
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Since prevention can be a highly cost-effective intervention, many coun-
tries and insurers around the world encourage individuals to participate in
certain types of preventive care. In the Netherlands, the government provides
several preventive healthcare interventions free of charge to certain groups in
the population. These include flu shots (population aged 65+, every year),
cervical cancer tests (women 30–60 years old, every 5 years), and breast can-
cer tests (“mammograms”; women aged 50+, every 2 years). Public informa-
tion on these preventive healthcare interventions is generally characterized by
a similar lack of quantitative information.9 A more advanced way to dissemi-
nate risk information are websites that provides a personalized estimate of an
individual’s health risk as a function of basic demographic, health condition,
and health-related behavior. An example is www.yourdiseaserisk.com.
Similar to other future investments, there are many reasons why people
may not participate in these programs. While for some people non-partici-
pation is likely to be rational, many individuals who should rationally par-
ticipate actually do not. Forward-looking individuals with a sufficiently low
discount rate will rationally choose to participate in these programs. Those
with a particularly high discount rate and those with an excellent general
health status will rationally choose not to participate. However, myopia, cog-
nitive biases and lack of information or understanding about the costs and
benefits of these programs may lead others to choose, irrationally, not to par-
ticipate.
Other policies to minimize informational failures include nutrition edu-
cation (in schools and elsewhere) and improved nutrition labeling. Regula-
tions in the Netherlands do not require nutrition labels to be in languages
other than Dutch. However, as health risks are particularly prevalent in eth-
nic minorities with limited knowledge of Dutch, it might be helpful if nutri-
tion labels contain information in a number of minority languages as well; see
Variyam and Cawley (2006). However, in the study by Downs et al. (2009)
calory information does not affect calory intake. De Ridder and de Wit (2007)
finds that “light” labels could even increase calory intake, and thus work
counterproductively. Glaeser (2006) argues that information that does not
affect behavior merely imposes a psychological “tax” on consumers and should
thus be avoided. Thus, while providing more information seems to be a non-
controversial policy recommendation, the evidence on its effectiveness is mixed.
A similar conclusion holds for the effectiveness of food logo’s; see Grunert
and Wills (2007) and Health Council (2008). In any case, behavioral evi-
9 An exception is the website on mammograms (www.borstfoto.nl). The site also mentions
that the screening has a large chance of a Type I error (test outcome is “negative” for a per-
son who actually has the disease) and a Type II error (test outcome is “positive” for a person
who actually does not have the disease). Thus, if the test turns out positive, a person is likely
to be concerned, but this will be followed by relief in 6 out of 10 cases. This information is
obviously highly relevant for deciding whether or not to take the test.
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dence underscores the importance of certification of information by impartial
actors.
We briefly discuss three specific examples of how behavioral insights might
be used more effectively in healthcare policies.
5.3 Organ Donations
Contrary to many other countries, organ donation laws and regulations in
The Netherlands are based on the principle of “informed consent”: individ-
uals are assumed to be unwilling to donate organs after death, unless they
have explicitly indicated otherwise. Recent studies suggest that organ dona-
tion rates are likely to increase if the system is changed into “presumed con-
sent”: a person is assumed to be willing to donate organs, unless he or she
explicitly indicated otherwise (see, for example, Johnson and Goldstein 2003,
and Abadie and Gay 2006). Where this meets with ethical objections, a useful
alternative would be mandatory active choice. Government forms could con-
tain a question “Do you wish to be an organ donor?” and require citizens to
tick a box YES or NO, or Don’t Know” (which would count as a NO). If tax
forms cannot be submitted electronically unless one of the boxes is ticked –
similar to boxes that need to be ticked when booking an airline ticket – this
would result in a significant increase in organ donors, without people being
guided into an unwanted silent choice.
5.4 Commitment Device for Attending a Health Club
The evidence reported in DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006) and Charness
and Gneezy (2009) shows that many members of health clubs sincerely intend
to visit their club with a certain frequency, but fail to act accordingly. A pos-
sible self-enforcement mechanism looks as follows.
The consumer signs a contract with his/her health club in which he/she
agrees to visit the health club (say) once a week. The contract also specifies
that the consumer will be fined (say 200 percent of the price per visit) for each
week skipped. He/she agrees that fines will be automatically and immediately
charged from his/her bank account. As a reward for signing this contract,
the first visit(s) will be free of charge. People attend less than they intended
because they underestimate the (non-monetary) costs of the weekly visits to
the health club. As the fine increases the costs of not going to the health club,
individuals who lack willpower will be induced to go.
The scheme will be appealing to sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, who
are aware of their tendency to behave inconsistently. The naive hyperbolic dis-
counters will claim that they do not need the fine clause in their contract,
but will be tempted to agree because of the free first visit(s). Another pos-
sibility is to attempt to educate naive hyperbolic discounters so that they will
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become sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, by confronting them with incon-
sistent behavior in the past.
In case the proposed incentive system generates positive net revenues, these
can be used for some general (but not individual) health purpose.
5.5 Setting Healthy Defaults
Menu design in restaurants (for example by setting a vegetarian dish as the
plat du jour) and the order of food display in cafetarias are other inexpen-
sive ways to affect choice behavior. Adaptations in multi-story buildings can
encourage visitors to take the stairs rather than the elevator; cf. Engbers
(2007). As in other cases, such policies are paternalistic in the sense that
the implicit price ratios (broadly defined) of various options are changed;
at the same time these policies are libertarian since no option is excluded
from the choice set.
6 CONCLUSION
The economics literature shows early traces of behavioral economics with the
contributions by Smith (multiple selves), Samuelson (time preferences), Stigler
(imperfect information), and Simon (bounded rationality). Building on these
seminal contributions and psychological research, the field of behavioral eco-
nomics has created more precise knowledge on how actual behavior deviates
from full rationality. Recent theoretical contributions have formalized the dis-
tinction between revealed and normative preferences, aiming to develop a wel-
fare theoretic basis for libertarian paternalism.
Behavorial insights help designing better policies that are less intrusive, less
expensive, and more effective than many existing policies. Policies with more
choice and more competition as basic principles can be counterproductive as
a means to improve consumer welfare since they can create choice paralysis
and consumer confusion. Issues like defaults and framing cannot be avoided,
and therefore it is better to try to use them thoughtfully.
As with any government intervention, policy initiatives based soft-pater-
nalism should be preceded by an analysis of costs and benefits and on a
design that recognizes consumer heterogeneity. Preferably, full implementation
should be preceded by small-scale field experiments to assess effectiveness.
These experiments will contribute to a better understanding of the
policy implications of behavioral economics.
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